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THE LEGITIMACY OF UNSECURED CREDITOR PROTECTION THROUGH THE LENS OF CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
Dr Jingchen Zhao 
Dr Shuangge Wen 
 
In this article, the protection of  unsecured creditors as a special group of stakeholders will be discussed from a progressive viewpoint, linking 
their position to the concept of  Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). CSR has been gaining impetus globally in the last two decades by 
promoting stakeholder- and society-friendly innovations and changes in governmental policies and business operations, and by promoting 
enforceable improvements in future strategic plans. The adoption of  CSR principles results in a movement away from the separate consideration 
of  the position of  individual constituencies towards a broader and more philosophical consideration of  the function of  corporations in society, a 
change in focus in the UK to emphasise the long-term interests of  corporations. With reference to the current legal inefficiencies, this paper 
addresses itself  to the necessity of  protection for unsecured creditors as a disadvantaged group of  stakeholders in various insolvency regimes, and 
examines ways to expatiate this. The impetus gained from progressive discussions of  CSR will provide a platform for future legislative reform 
and result in further protection for unsecured creditors.  
 
‘Money, it’s a crime. Share it fairly but don’t take a slice of  my pie.’ 
Roger Waters1 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
                                                 
 This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of  an article accepted for publication in Journal of  Business Law following peer review. The definitive 
published version (2013) 8 Journal of  Business Law 868-898 is available online on Westlaw UK or from Thomson Reuters DocDel service . 
 Lecturer in Law, University of  Salford, j.zhao@salford.ac.uk  
Lecturer in Law, Swansea University, s.wen@swansea.ac.uk. We would like to express our gratitude to Professor Rob Merkin for his encouragement and an 
anonymous referee for useful suggestions on an early draft of  this piece.  
1 ‘Money’ from Pink Floyd, The Dark Side of  the Moon (1973). 
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In a previous article written with John Tribe, we argued that directors owe duties to creditors, and, further, that they continue to owe 
duties to creditors during formal insolvency procedures. These duties take the form of obligations towards wider stakeholders, 
including those that fall under the umbrella of CSR, and they are evidence for the extent to which CSR concepts have become 
enshrined in English law.2 In this article, the protection of unsecured creditors as a special stakeholder group will be further singled 
out, from the angle of a progressive view of corporate law.3 Within this progressive assessment, a broader variety of social and 
political values are considered which together form the basis of CSR; progressive theorists suggest that whether the company is 
useful or not should be measured by assessing the social effects of corporate activity – how effectively it improves the overall 
welfare of society.4 As well as the interests of shareholders, it is suggested that there are other important constituencies that warrant 
consideration from directors, such as creditors, employees, local communities, suppliers and consumers.5 This acknowledgment has 
led to arguments about more stakeholder-friendly reforms in the fields of corporate law and insolvency law, as well as an increasing 
amount of calls from the public and the academic community for more socially responsible behaviour from businesses in favour of 
those who are in vulnerable and disadvantaged positions.6  
 
In the UK, one prominent legislative change that has demonstrated the progressive view is the enlightened shareholder value 
principle, enshrined in s172 of  the Companies Act 2006, requiring directors to have regard to non-shareholder constituencies’ 
interests in corporate operations. While the “regard list” in s 172(1) does not include creditors, their interests as an important 
stakeholder group have been specifically considered in s 172(3), which requires directors to act for creditors’ benefits as any rule of  
law (mostly insolvency-related rules) provides. While the law as it currently stands might work as a pragmatic approach to 
progressive business practices, on the ground that it provided guidelines to directors for the execution of  stakeholder- and 
society-friendly strategies,7 it falls short of  taking care of  one particularly vulnerable group – unsecured creditors. Indeed, a glance 
at the unsecured creditors’ position in a distressed company suggests a disappointing reality and a need for further protection. 
Before the process of  insolvency has even begun, the fees for the insolvency proceedings, which are paid ahead of  the settlement of  
creditors’ claims, have already eroded or exhausted a large amount of  “what would otherwise be available to creditors, particularly 
                                                 
2 J. Zhao & J. Tribe, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in an Insolvent Environment: Directors’ Continuing Obligations in English Law’ (2010) International Company 
and Commercial Law Review 305 at 315. 
3 For discussions on progressive scholarship of  corporate law see L.E. Mitchell (edn) Progressive Corporate Law Boulder, Colo.; Oxford: Westview Press (1995).; L. 
Talbot, Progressive Corporate Governance for the 21st Century London Routledge (2012).  
4 D. Sullivan & D. Conlon, ‘Crisis and Transition in Corporate Governance Paradigms: The Role of  the Chancery Court of  Delaware’ (1997) Law and Society 
Review 713;D. Millon, ‘Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundation and Law Reform Strategies’ in L.E. Mitchell (ed.) Progressive Corporate Law, Boulder, Colo.; 
Oxford: Westview Press (1995). 
5 E.M. Dodd, ‘For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?’ (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1145. 
6 H. Anderson, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility – The Case for Unsecured Creditors’ (2007) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 93 at 93. 
7; DTI (Department of  Trade and Industry), Corporate Social Responsibility: A Government Update (2004). 
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unsecured creditors”8. Even when there are still some crumbs left after the enormous proceeding fees, the position of  unsecured 
creditors is still not favourable. Given the fact that creditors’ claims in insolvency proceedings are ranked according to priority, 
groups of  unsecured creditors, who stand at the end of  the line as the lowest ranking group, often end up penniless.9 Evidence 
from a recent study, carried out in 2010 by the OFT within five hundred administrations, revealed that the recovery rate for 
unsecured creditors was 4%, while preferential creditors had the highest average recovery rate of  83%.10 To make things even worse, 
these disadvantaged unsecured creditors overpay in fees by around £15 million per annum during the administration process, as a 
result of  their lower ranking and limited influence. This is in stark contrast to secured creditors, who have direct control over setting 
the fees of  Insolvency Practitioners (IPs).11 As commented by Office of  Fair Trading, “current regulatory regimes did not do 
enough to rectify the lack of  power on behalf  of  unsecured creditors”.12 
 
 
There has been much discussion of  the status of  secured and unsecured creditors in insolvency regimes, and of  how to balance the 
interests of  these two parties both in Commonwealth countries13 and across the Atlantic14 in order to maintain a fair balance of  
assets distribution in various insolvency cases. So far, concerns have mainly been raised in the legal domain, focusing on the 
vulnerability of  unsecured creditors under various insolvency regimes and the inadequacy of  present legal frameworks in ensuring 
the protection of  some non-shareholder constituencies’ interests.15 Suggestions are also put forward in the field of  insolvency law, 
e.g. certain restrictions that may be placed on the powers of  secured creditors in enforcing their securities.16 Through the lens of  
CSR, this article seeks to complement and further contribute to the existing field of  research by justifying the morality of  protecting 
                                                 
8 The Insolvency Service, Consultation on Reforms to the Regulation of  Insolvency Practitioners, February (2011) para 2.22. 
9 The Insolvency Service, Consultation on Reforms to the Regulation of  Insolvency Practitioners, February (2011) para 2.22. 
10 Office of  Fair Trading, The Market for Corporate Insolvency Practitioners (2010) 13. 
11 The Insolvency Service, Consultation on Reforms to the Regulation of  Insolvency Practitioners, February (2011) para 2.29. 
12 The Institute of  Chartered Accounts of  Scotland, ‘Consultation on Reform to the Regulation of  Insolvency Practitioners’ (2011) available via  
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/insolvency/docs/insolvency%20profession/consultations/ipregulation/responses/27%20%20institute%20of%20chartered%20acc
ountants%20in%20scotland.pdf  
13 See R.M. Goode, ‘The Death of  Insolvency’ (1980) 3 Company Lawyer 123; R.M. Goode, ‘Creditors’ Rights: the Cork Proposals’ (1983) Company Lawyer 51; R.J. 
Mokal, ‘The Search for Someone to Save: A Defensive Case for the Priority of  Secured Credit’, (2002) 22 Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies 687; G. McGormack, ‘The 
Priority of  Secured Credit: An Anglo-American Perspective’ (2003) Journal of  Business Law 389; V. Finch, ‘Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who pays the price?’ 
(1999) 62 Modern Law Review 633; D. Milman, ‘A New Deal for Companies and Unsecured Creditors’ (2000) Company Lawyer 59; D. Milman, ‘Priority Right on 
Corporate Insolvency’ in A. Clarke, Current Issues in Insolvency Law, London: Sevens & Son, (1992) 57; D.D. Prince, ‘Some Observations on the Law Relating To 
Preferences’, Chapter 19 of  R. Cranston, Making Commercial Law: Essays in Honour of  Roy Goode, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1997) 445; J Hudson, ‘The Case 
Against Secured Lending’ (1995) International Review of  Law and Economics 47. 
14 See S.L. Schwarcz, ‘The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy’ (1997) Duke Law Journal 425; L.A. Bebchuk & J.M. Fried, ‘The Uneasy 
Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy’ (1996) Yale Law Journal 857; D.G. Carlson, ‘On the Efficiency of Secured Lending’ (1994) 80 Virginia Law 
Review 2179; S.L. Harris & C.W. Mooney, ‘A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors’ Choice Seriously’ (1994) 80 Virginia Law Review 2021; 
T.H. Jackson & A.T. Kronman, ‘Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors’ (1979) 88 Yale Law Journal 1143; H. Kanda & S. Levmore, ‘Explaining 
Creditor Priorities’ (1994) 80 Virginia Law Review 2103; L.M. LoPucki, ‘The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain’ (1994) 80 Virginia Law Review 1887. 
15 H. Anderson, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility – The Case for Unsecured Creditors’ (2007) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 93 at 94. 
16 See Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of  Review Committee, Chairman: Sir Kenneth Cork, GBE, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of  State for Trade by 
Command of  Her Majesty June 1982; since the surname of  the chairman is Cork, the report is generally known as the Cork Report. The phrase “Cork Report” will 
be used to refer to the Report of  the Review Committee throughout this article. 
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unsecured creditors and suggesting plausible ways for doing so above and beyond the current legislative protection. It advocates the 
legitimacy of  unsecured creditors’ protection by disputing the narrow economic rationale of  secured creditor protection, and offers 
a new perspective on the safeguarding of  unsecured creditors’ interests.17 The theme of  the paper will be outlined by exploring the 
following questions: How are secured creditors favoured in current insolvency regimes? Are these treatments justifiable in the light 
of  wider realistic considerations rather than idealistic economic scales? Is it feasible to conduct any radical reform in current 
insolvency regimes, in order to place limits on the excessive power granted to secured creditors and promote the position of  
unsecured creditors? Finally, can the concept and practice of  CSR be related to the protection of  unsecured creditors, beyond their 
position simply as a cohort of  stakeholders who are seeking legislative protection? 
 
Putting the CSR theme onto the agenda for reform, this research further juxtaposes itself  with existing research on unsecured 
creditor protection by promoting a shift from the separate consideration of  the position of  individual constituencies towards a 
broader and more philosophical consideration of  the function of  corporations in their societies, and a change to focus on the 
long-term interests of  corporations in Britain.18 It initially identifies the inferior position of  unsecured creditors in comparison with 
the priority given to secured creditors in various insolvency contexts, thus setting the ground for the necessity of  protecting 
unsecured creditors according to the principles of  CSR. The legitimacy of  unsecured creditor protection through the lens of  CSR 
will be asserted, initially by disputing the narrow economic rationale for secured creditor protection, and then by investigating the 
normative implications of  CSR, which would be an appropriate platform to trigger both legislative reform and soft law 
developments. Last but not least, detailed statutory and soft law modifications will be proposed, aiming for a progressive approach 
towards greater unsecured creditor protection. 
 
II. A WORLD OF UNDUE EXPLOITATION OF UNSECURED CREDITORS – AN EXPLORATION 
 
A  Secured and Unsecured Creditors 
 
Before examining the unfair legal position of  unsecured creditors, it is worthwhile first to delineate the various types of  creditors in 
different insolvency regimes. Under the modern corporate finance doctrine of  maximising shareholder wealth, categories of  
creditors are not specifically distinguished in the company law context,19 but this issue is certainly a primary one characterising fields 
                                                 
17 H. Anderson, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility – The Case for Unsecured Creditors’ (2007) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 93 at 95. 
 
19 For instance, section 172(3) of  the CA 2006 provides that the duty to promote the success of  the company has effect, subject to any enactment or rule of  law 
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such as securities regulations and insolvency regimes. In general, depending on whether a creditor is a holder of  a qualifying security 
interest in his debtor’s property, these financial providers can be classified into secured and unsecured creditors. “The possession of  
a real right over one or more of  the debtor’s assets is what distinguishes the secured from the unsecured creditor.”20 This criterion is 
mainly governed by the law of  contract, and lenders (creditors) and borrowers (companies) are normally free to bargain for such 
contractual terms as are appropriate to their particular circumstances and their assessment of  risk.21 Money invested by secured 
creditors is always exchanged upon the creditor taking charge of  some of  the company’s assets, i.e. security, which gives them 
privileged access to information as well as a certain amount of  control over the conduct of  the debtor’s business – rights that 
cannot be gained by exclusive reliance on personal covenant.22 In the worst case scenario, where companies go into insolvency, this 
allows them priority payment in competition with a wide assortment of  other claimants. 
 
At the outset, there are five basic regimes to handle a company in financial distress. These are: administrative receivership, 
administration, winding up (liquidation), statutory compromise, and compositions and arrangements with creditors and 
organisations arranged contractually outside the framework of  corporate insolvency law. While the liquidation of  a company 
involves the cessation of  its business and the realization of  its assets in satisfaction of  its debts, the other four regimes are primarily 
designed as rescue procedures, in the hope that through their operation the company’s business can be revived, at least in part.23 As 
will be presented, as well as the primary aim of  allowing secured financing in the liquidation context – secured interests ranking 
above the claims of  unsecured creditors – in practice secured creditors gain further advantages throughout all five regimes, including 
privileged access to information,24 undue influence over the market behaviour of  the debtor and the IP, and distortion of  
competition by prejudicing non-adjustable unsecured creditors.25 In stark contrast, the rights of  unsecured creditors, who make up 
the vast majority of  creditors and have been said to “receive a raw deal”,26 are not as positive. These creditors lack even a vestigial 
interest in the debtor’s property,27 and they have “no claim either to a specific asset or to a fund, merely the right to sue for his 
money and to invoke the process of  the law to enforce a judgment against the defendant”28.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
requiring directors to consider or act in the interests of  creditors of  the company. 
20 E. McKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law, London: Penguin Books, (2010) p.624. 
21 J. Birds, A.J. Boyle, B. Clark, I. MacNeil, G. McCormack, C. Twigg-Flesner & C. Villiers, Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 8th ed, (2011, Jordans), p. 311. 
22 R.M. Goode, ‘Is the Law too Favourable to secured creditors?’ (1983) 8 Canadian Business Law Journal 53 at 56. 
23 J. Birds, A.J. Boyle, B. Clark, I. MacNeil, G. McCormack, C. Twigg-Flesner & C. Villiers, Boyle & Birds’ Company Law (8th ed), (2011, Jordans), 858–9. 
24 V. Finch, ‘Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who pays the price?’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 633 at 637–638. 
25 The principal objection against secured financing is that when a corporate debtor arranges a secured loan with a creditor, this has the prejudicial effect of  
transferring the insolvency value from other involuntary unsecured creditors to the secured creditor, since unsecured creditors are not in a position to adjust their 
claims against the debtor. See L.A. Bebchuk & J.M. Fried, “The Uneasy Case for the Priority of  Secured Claims in Bankruptcy” (1996) 105 Yale Law Journal 
857–934, at 882–7. 
26 Borden (UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products Ltd [1981] Ch25 at 42 per Templeman LJ. See also Business Computers v Anglo-African Leasing [1977] 1 WLR 578.  
27 Re Ehrmann Bros Ltd [1906] 2 Ch 697. 
28 E. McKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law, London: Penguin Books (2010), 625. 
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B. Priority and Control: Undue Favours accrued to Secured Creditors in Insolvency Regimes 
 
As with other systems of  insolvency law, the UK legal system for insolvency has been developed on the foundation of  two basic 
propositions: priority in terms of  the allocation of  assets, and control of  the rights to affect the liquidator or other people in charge 
of  the business. Though the positive value of  secured financing, which goes some way toward accounting for the widespread use of  
this type of  investment, should not be overlooked,29 the present security and priority regimes seem to have gone out of  their way to 
protect secured creditors according to the legal propositions, shifting the risks disproportionately to unsecured creditors.  
 
1. Liquidation 
 
In general, liquidation is a process which only occurs to a company when it becomes insolvent. This could be either because of  a 
cash flow shortage, i.e. the company is unable to fulfil its duty of  payment when debts fall due, or else it might fall foul on the 
balance sheet, i.e. its collective liabilities exceed the assets on the books.30 Regardless of  the differing criteria applied, a common aim 
shared by all liquidators in a winding-up process is to provide “an equal, fair and orderly procedure in handling the affairs of  
insolvents, ensuring that creditors receive an equal and equitable distribution of  the assets”.31 To this end, the pari passu principle, a 
fundamental and legally-enshrined rule of  corporate insolvency law laid down in 1542,32 seemingly works for the benefit of  
unsecured creditors, with the stipulation that all creditors are put on an equal footing and share the insolvency assets pro rata 
according to their pre-insolvency entitlements or the sums they are owed.  
 
Despite its apparent appeal, however, the pari passu principle is almost defunct, owing to the substantial number of  qualifications and 
exceptions it is subject to.33 A primary one of  these is the existence of  security interests. The principal aim of  permitting some 
creditors to hold additional rights in rem against a debtor’s assets is to reduce the risk they face in relation to the debtor’s present and 
                                                 
29 A major advantage of  secured financing, as noted, is to facilitate the raising of  capital, particularly in companies having low credit ratings. For further 
discussions, see S. Harris & C. Mooney, “A Property Based Theory of  Security Interests: Taking Debtors’ Choices Seriously” (1994) 80 Virginia Law Review 2021, 
at 2033–7. 
30 D. Milman, “Strategies for Regulating Managerial Performance in the ‘Twilight Zone’ – Familiar Dilemmas: New Considerations” (2004) Journal of  Business Law 
493; J. Birds, A.J. Boyle, B. Clark, I. MacNeil, G. McCormack, C. Twigg-Flesner & C. Villiers, Boyle & Birds’ Company Law (8th ed), (2011, Jordans), 858. 
31 A. Keay & P. Walton, Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal, 2nd Edn., Bristol: Jordans (2008) 22. 
32 It was laid down in the Bankruptcy Act 1542 that “…for true Satisfaction and Payment of  the said Creditors: This is to say, to every one of  the said Creditors, 
a Portion Rate and Rate like, according to the Quantity of  their Debt.” Also see Insolvency Act 1986 Section 107; the Insolvency Rules 1986 r. 4.181 (1). 
33 E.g. trust assets in allocation fall entirely outside the ambit of  the pari passu rule.  
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future indebtedness, and to insulate them from the principle of  pari passu distribution in insolvency.34 Secured creditors will always 
retain their pre-insolvency priority for payment based on their proprietary and personal rights,35 and are entitled to be repaid out of  
the proceeds of  the realisation of  their security in priority over other claimants on the company’s assets.  
 
Priority in the event of  liquidation is a consequence of  the proprietary interests vested in these holders, as well as being one of  their 
primary reasons for taking up security.36 However, this feature has a direct bearing on the interests of  unsecured creditors, as it 
reduces the pool of  assets available to them. It is also essential to note that the enforcement of  security rights almost invariably 
causes damage to the interests of  the general body of  unsecured creditors, by removing assets which are required for the running of  
the business, forcing an untimely realisation, or asserting security rights so as to inhibit the liquidator’s ability to deal with the 
company’s trading stock for the purpose of  the beneficial liquidation of  the company.37 As a result, pooled assets will usually be 
insubstantial and quite inadequate to meet the claims of  unsecured creditors.38 This is probably best illustrated by practical figures: 
nowadays 55% of  unsecured creditors expect to recover nothing in an insolvency process.39 This low expectation however still 
appears too optimistic in the real world, in which unsecured creditors only receive a payment in 20% of  cases, with a startlingly low 
average return of  4%.40 
 
The high cost of  liquidation has also become a substantial drain on the assets available for unsecured creditors. Before the 
Companies Act 2006 was implemented, common law traditionally regarded this expense as solely a matter for unsecured creditors.41 
Although s. 1282 of  CA 2006 seeks to improve unsecured creditors’ unfavourable situation by providing that the expenses of  
winding up constitute a prior claim on floating charge proceeds, in practice this rule can easily be circumvented. As long as the first 
charge (or equal ranking charge) on the asset is a fixed charge, then the assets will not be subject to these rules relating to liquidation 
expenses.42 This provides a practical loophole for banks, who, as the biggest group of  secured creditors, can easily pump out the 
asset pool via a combined use of  fixed and floating charges, and leave unsecured creditors with literally nothing but the burden of  
                                                 
34 See s. 107 of  IA 1986. 
35 S.E. Weeler, ‘The Insolvency Act 1986 and Retention of  Title’ (1987) May Journal of  Business Law 180 at 180; also note the dissimilarity of  the Court of  
Appeal’s view in Clough Mill v. Martin [1984] 3 All E.R. 982; Re Law Merthyr Consolidated Collieries [1929] 1 Ch. 498; Insolvency Act 1986, section 251. 
36 Kenneth Cork, Report of  the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (Cork Report), Cmnd 8558 (1982), at Chapter 35; Paul L Davies, S Worthington & E 
Micheler, Gower and Davies’ Principles of  Modern Company Law, 8th ed, (2008, Sweet & Maxwell), at 1161. 
37 R. M. Goode, ‘Is the law too favourable to secured creditors?’ (1983) 8 Canadian Business Law Journal 53 at 70. 
38 B. Hannigan, Company Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009) 687–688. 
39 The results yielded on basis of  a survey distributed to 882 unsecured creditors. See Office of  Unfair Trading, The Market for Corporate Insolvency Practitioners – a 
Market Study, (2010), OFT 1245, at 45. 
40 Ibid., at 45. 
41 See the House of  Lords’ judgment in Buchler v Talbot [2004] 2 AC 298, in which the decision in Re Barleycorn Enterprises Ltd [1970] Ch 465 was overruled on the 
ground that liquidation expenses should not be paid out of  floating charge assets. 
42 Re Lewis Merthyr Consolidated Collieries Ltd [1929] 1 Ch 498; also see discussions in Paul L Davies, S Worthington & E Micheler, Gower and Davies’ Principles of  
Modern Company Law, 8th ed, (2008, Sweet & Maxwell), at 1178-9. 
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liquidation expenses. This sad fact was recently re-asserted by the Office of  Fair Trading (OFT), who discovered that in more than 
40% of  cases, unsecured creditors waited for two to three years for the process to be completed with no money paid back, and 
unsecured creditors, including HM Revenue and Customs, also paid 9% more in insolvency fees than secured creditors.43 
 
To be fair, it would be wrong to conclude that the unfair footing of  unsecured creditors in liquidation, particularly the difficulty of  
bearing high liquidation expenses, always goes unnoticed. As far back as 1897, there was the idea to dilute “the extraordinary 
benefits which come to the holder of  a floating charge” in favour of  unsecured creditors in cases of  formal insolvency .44 This 
obiter dictum was taken up by the Cork Committee in 1982 and was reflected in its report in the form of  a recommended compulsory 
surrender of  10% of  the net realisation of  assets, subject to a floating charge being set aside for distribution among unsecured 
creditors.45 The Enterprise Act 2002 Section 252 introduced s. 176A into the Insolvency Act, which imposes an obligation on the 
insolvency officeholder to hold back a prescribed portion of  the net realisations achieved under any applicable floating charge, to be 
set aside for distribution among the unsecured creditors. The intention of  the legislation was to transfer the benefits formerly 
enjoyed by the Crown46 to unsecured creditors. However, it is important to be aware that s. 176A(2) of  the Insolvency Act 1986 is 
subject to important exceptions: it will not apply if  the net property of  the company is less than a prescribed minimum,47 or if  the 
officeholder thinks that the cost of  making a distribution to unsecured creditors would be disproportionate to the benefit, which is 
usually the case.48 It is also crucial to note that this “prescribed portion” rule leaves some important issues unresolved.49 For 
instance, what will happen if  the holder of  the floating charge realises his security before the prescribed part is distributed? Can he 
then be regarded as an unsecured creditor and benefit from the prescribed portion rule? In practice, the uncertainties in relation to 
this rule encourage creditors to take different kinds of  security other than floating charges, which consequently hinders effective 
rescues and eventually leads to unsecured creditors being collectively even worse off.50  
 
2. Administration 
 
                                                 
43 Office of  Fair Trading, Corporate Insolvency In-Depth Interview with Creditors: A Report for the OFT, prepared by Marketing Sciences, June 2010. 
44 Per Lord Macnaghten’s comments in Saloman v A Saloman & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 at 53, where he proposes giving trade creditors a limited form of  preferential 
claim. Also see S. Davies, Insolvency and the Enterprise Act 2002, Bristol: Jordans, 2nd Edn., (2003) 51. 
45 This is the so-called “Ten Per Cent Fund” in paras 1538–1549 of  the Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of  the Review Committee (The Cork Report).  
46 M. Andrews, ‘UK: Change And Uncertainty Under the Enterprise Act’ (2003) 22 International Financial Law Review 56 at 57; according to the DTI (now the BIS), 
The Enterprise Bill, Insolvency Provision—Regulatory Impact, para 5.29, the abolition of  Crown preferences will release approximately £90 million per year to 
unsecured creditors. The vast majority of  this sum will funnel into administrations and administrative receivership; recoveries by the Crown under its preferential 
rights in liquidation and bankruptcies will be considerably smaller.  
47 Section 176A(3), Insolvency Act 1986. 
48 S 176A (3) of  Insolvency Act 1986. See Re Hydroserve Ltd [2008] BCC 175, in which the court conveniently disapplied s. 176A; also see discussions in A.R. Keay, 
McPherson’s Law of  Company Liquidation, London: Sweet & Maxwell (2001) 746. 
49 For detailed discussions on this matter, see Roy Goode, Principles of  Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th ed, (2011, Sweet & Maxwell), at 211–1. 
50 See V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles 2nd ed, (2009, CUP), at 108–9; J Armour, “Should We Redistribute in Insolvency?”, at 223–4.  
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The main area of  complexity in the protection of  unsecured creditors is corporate rescue, as shown in the administration involved. 
The essential purposes of  administration form a hierarchy, demonstrating the priority of  the aims that administration is supposed to 
achieve:51 to rescue the company as a going concern; to achieve a better result for the creditors as a whole than would be likely if  
the company was simply wound up; and, in case the first two objectives are unachievable in the assessment of  the administrator, to 
realise property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or preferential creditors.52 At face value, it could be 
suggested that the overall delineation of  the administration regime works towards the benefit of  unsecured creditors, as they will at 
least be better off  in the first two situations than their counterparts in a winding-up or an administrative receivership. Legislative 
support for this argument primarily comes from two aspects: the shift in focus of  administrators’ obligations, and the employment 
of  the moratorium. In comparison with the fact that an administrative receiver’s principal obligations are towards his appointer even 
though receivership impacts significantly on the interests of  unsecured creditors, an administrator has a duty to act in the interests 
of  all creditors, which presumably confers unsecured creditors more opportunities for input and participation.53 Furthermore, when 
a moratorium is triggered, a freeze is imposed on all proceedings or executions against the company and its assets, which is intended 
to prohibit secured creditors from enforcing their rights during administration.54  
 
Nevertheless, upon investigation of  the legal practices following the introduction of  the administration regime, it is not difficult to 
see that it still fails to adequately protect the interests of  unsecured creditors. An obvious initial issue is the fact that the moratorium 
can be relaxed and secured creditors can enforce their security when the administrator consents or when leave of  the court is 
obtained.55 In an indication of  the flexible operation of  the moratorium, there is a not-so-strict line that the courts has been taking 
as regards secured creditors lifting the conditions of  the moratorium. A starting point would be Royal Trust Bank v Buchler,56 which 
occurred only six years after the administration regime was finally consolidated. Although the application of  the secured creditor to 
appoint a receiver was refused because it lacked proper grounds, Peter Gibson J. nevertheless confirmed the general orthodoxy in 
relation to leave to enforce the security – i.e. it was not necessary to demonstrate any criticism of  the administrator’s conduct in 
order for a court to grant a secured creditor leave to enforce their security.57 Weighing up the conflicting interests, the following 
judgment in Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc (No 1) further illustrated the tilting of  the balance towards secured creditors when their 
                                                 
51 Schedule B1, para 3 (1). 
52 See para 3(1), Schedule B1. 
53 DTI, “Productivity and Enterprise – Insolvency: A Second Chance” (Cm 5234, 2001), at paras 2.12, 2.2–2.3; B Hannigan, Company Law, 2nd ed, (2009, OUP), 
at 616. 
54 IA 1986, Schedule B(1), para 43(2). 
55 See para 43, Schedule B1. 
56 [1989] BCLC 130. 
57 [1989] BCLC 130. 
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legitimate interests and those of  the other creditors are in contradiction.58 As stipulated by Nicholls L.J., in carrying out the 
balancing exercise, the underlying principle is always that an administration for the benefit of  unsecured creditors should not 
interfere in the benefits of  those who have proprietary rights, save to the extent that this may be unavoidable, and even then this will 
usually be acceptable only to a strictly limited extent.59 To this end, the court, drawing upon Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C’s 
observation in Bristol Airport plc v Powdrill60 in terms of  applications for the granting of  leave, concluded that the power of  the 
moratorium in administration should be constrained, at least to the extent that its employment would not disturb the full rights of  
those who are secured creditors.61 Thus the unfavourable situation of  unsecured creditors in administration was again evident when 
measured against secured creditors: in any case, it was never intended that administration would strengthen the administrator’s hand 
in negotiations with property owners who could not assert their full rights because of  the moratorium.62  
 
A central problem in complex administration scenarios is that the hierarchy of  purposes of  administration can be practically 
distorted by the claims of  secured creditors. The current legislative regime expects that an administrator, in his day-to-day 
management of  the company’s affairs, will strive to rescue the company as a going concern and perform his functions for the 
benefit of  the company’s creditors as a whole.63 Underlying this structure is the assumption that creditors are to have an important 
say in administration.64 However, observations from practice suggest that unsecured creditors rarely have the opportunity to exert 
any influence in the conduct of  administration, while administrators often seek the support of  secured creditors. A reason 
frequently used to justify the neglect of  the voice of  unsecured creditors is that the business situation prevents the administrator 
from doing so. As Collins J. suggested in Re Transbus International Ltd,65 if  a tight timetable does not allow for the holding of  a 
creditors’ meeting, the administrators will be justified in not laying any proposals before the creditors. This is the case where the 
requirements of  para. 52 are satisfied, e.g. where unsecured creditors are going to receive no payment.66 
 
Even if  a meeting of  creditors is convened to consider the administrator’s proposals, it has very limited powers in practice. The 
meeting of  creditors can accept the administrator’s proposal in full, but any modification suggested by the meeting is subject to the 
                                                 
58 [1992] Ch 505. 
59 [1992] Ch 505, per Nicholls L.J., at 542. 
60 [1990] 2 WLR 1362, 1379. 
61 [1992] Ch 505, per Nicholls L.J., at 542 ; also see discussions in B. Hannigan, Company Law, 2nd ed, (2009, OUP), at 634. 
62 Ibid.. 
63 IA 1986, Sch B1, para 3(1). 
64 J. Birds, A.J. Boyle, B. Clark, I. MacNeil, G. McCormack, C. Twigg-Flesner & C. Villiers, Boyle & Birds’ Company Law (8th ed), (2011, Jordans), 897. 
65 [2004] 2 All ER 911, at 12-13 of  the judgment. 
66 J. Birds, A.J. Boyle, B. Clark, I. MacNeil, G. McCormack, C. Twigg-Flesner & C. Villiers, Boyle & Birds’ Company Law (8th ed), (2011, Jordans), 898. 
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administrator’s consent.67 There is no shortage of  examples where creditors’ opposition towards the administrator’s proposal was 
ignored, allowing the latter to proceed as he thinks fit.68 Furthermore, secured lenders frequently assure their absolute influence 
over administrators’ actions by enforcing their final say on IPs’ appointments and fees.69 In practice, low attendance rates for 
unsecured creditors at these meetings are regularly observed,70 perhaps not least because they have little actual say in affecting the 
final decision made by insolvency practitioners. 
 
This bias in favour of  secured creditors was not significantly improved by the implementation of  the Enterprise Act 2002. Despite 
the goodwill, the reforming measures introduced by the EA, which were intended to effect a trickle-down of  the realisation of  
insolvent estates to the benefit of  unsecured creditors, seem unlikely to affect the overall position to any significant degree.71 For 
example, Mokal expressed doubts about the “top-slicing” idea when he tried to estimate the quantity of  additional benefits to 
unsecured creditors resulting from the removal of  Crown preference.72 From the low average recovery rate for unsecured creditors 
in the overwhelming majority of  formal insolvency proceedings, it seems obvious that unsecured creditors are not appreciably better 
off.73 Also, the claims held by employee-creditors, which are given preferential status, are vested in the Crown by way of  
subrogation.74 The most important change implemented in the Enterprise Act 2002 was the abolition of  administrative receivership 
in favour of  floating charges, but this reform is neither instantaneous nor comprehensive;75 the right to appoint an administrative 
receiver remains in place when floating charges are concerned with certain exempted categories of  transaction.76 Therefore, the 
enforcement of  the EA 2002 has not significantly improved the disadvantaged position of  unsecured creditors. In the recent case of  
Uniserve Limited and Others v Croxen and Others,77 the orthodox view in Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc was again fully upheld, exhibited 
by the Court’s reluctance to overturn a lien-holder’s established security against the use of  the moratorium. This legislative reform, 
whilst disappointing to unsecured creditors, clearly reflects the statement made in the early White Paper, to the effect that “secured 
creditors … should not feel at any risk from our proposals.”78 
 
                                                 
67 Schedule B1, para 52.  
68 E.g. Re Maxwell Communications Corp [1992] BCLC 465, at 467; Re Structures & Computers Ltd [1998] BCC 348. 
69 See comment made by David Stallibrass, director at the Office of  Fair Trading, quoted in Anousha Sakoui, “Unsecured Creditors Need Protection, Says OFT”, 
Financial Times, June 24, 2010. 
70 E.g., see S. Frisby, Report on Insolvency Outcomes, a paper presented to the Insolvency Service, at 54. 
71 B. Hannigan, Company Law 2nd edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009) 683  
72 R.J. Mokal, ‘Priority as Pathology: The pari passu Myth’ (2001) 6 The Cambridge Law Journal 581. 
73 Ibid. at 617–618. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. at 56. 
76 For example: Capital Market and PFI deals. See s 72(A)-(H) of  Insolvency Act 1986. 
77 [2012] EWHC 1190. 
78 Insolvency Service, While Paper, Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency – A Second Choice, Cm. 5234 (July 2001), at para 2.6. 
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3. Company Voluntary Arrangements (CVA)  
 
As a less formal option for companies which are experiencing financial difficulties, voluntary arrangements between a company and 
its creditors and members were originally introduced with a laudable intention, i.e., providing unsecured creditors with a means of  
recovering what they were owed without recourse to the more expensive recourse provided by winding up or administration, while 
also offering the company the continuing opportunity to trade.79 However, the laws and practices relevant to this scheme pose 
serious challenges to the fulfilment of  this objective from the following aspects. First of  all, although a company entering into a 
CVA is normally in financial difficulties, there is no formal requirement that the company has to be in a state of  insolvency. This 
leads to a rather unfair practical situation; although the CVAs are for the benefit of  unsecured creditors and do not bind secured 
creditors, support from the latter is crucial to the feasibility of  any CVA, as the company is likely to require additional funding from 
banks, which usually constitute a large proportion of  the company’s secured creditors.80 
 
This practical control over the voluntary arrangements granted to secured creditors is further enhanced by the fact that apart from 
the limitations stated above on secured creditors and preferential creditors, any proposal can be presented by directors for approval, 
provided that it is in satisfaction of  the company’s debts or a scheme of  arrangement of  its affairs.81 Evidence suggests that very 
few proposals at creditors’ meetings get modified or rejected, not least because of  the fact that very few unsecured creditors attend 
the creditors’ meetings owing to their inadequate knowledge and information about the process, as well as their limited level of  
influence.82 To a certain extent, secured credit is misused to “siphon away insolvency value from certain types of  unsecured 
creditors.”83 This is particularly the case when secured creditors are large banks who employ professional legal and financial experts 
to advise upon and draw up legal arrangements relating to secured lending,84 which can lead to a rather startling result in practice: 
although according to the rules secured creditors in creditors’ meetings may not vote on these arrangements other than with respect 
to any element of  their rights which are unsecured,85 courts have nevertheless established that it is possible for a creditors’ meeting 
to approve a scheme of  arrangement which will only benefit secured creditors, with no realistic prospect of  offering any payment to 
                                                 
79 Re NT Gallagher & Son Ltd [2002] 2 BCLC 133, CA. 
80 IA 1986, s 4(3). “A meeting … shall not approve any proposal or modification which affects the right of  a secured creditor of  the company to enforce his 
security, except with the concurrence of  the creditor concerned.” See further discussions in B. Hannigan, Company Law (2nd ed, 2009, OUP), at 599. 
81 S 1(1) of  IA 1986. 
82 According to the statistics disclosed by OFT, 80% of  creditors’ meetings in administrations agree with all the IP’s proposals. No unsecured creditors attend in 
nineteen out of  twenty creditors’ meetings. See Office of  Fair Trading, The Market for Corporate Insolvency Practitioners – A Market Study, (2010) OFT 1245, at 42. 
83 R.J. Mokal, ‘The Search for Someone to Save: A Defensive Case for the Priority of  Secured Credit’, (2002) 22 Ox ford Journal of  Legal Studies 687 at 690. 
84 J. Hudson, ‘The Case Against Secured Lending’ (1995) International Review of  Law and Economics 47 at 56. 
85 Insolvency Rules 1986, r, 1.17(1) & (2), 
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unsecured creditors.86 To add to their pain, the efficacy of  the voluntary arrangement follows from the fact that once it is in effect, 
it binds every creditor who would have been entitled to vote at the meeting.87 However, this means that those unsecured creditors 
for whom the nominee was unaware of  their existence will be bound by the proposal, notwithstanding the fact that their opinions 
have not been taken into account.88  
 
C. Redress Methods for Unsecured Creditors – A Narrow and Difficult Path 
 
One cannot deny that the current regulatory framework offers unsecured creditors some means to exercise their influence on IPs, 
such as mounting a challenge in court, or initiating winding-up proceedings. A typical legislative example is s.6 of  IA 1986, under 
which anyone entitled to vote at the creditors’ meetings can make an application on one or both of  the following grounds, namely: 
(1) that a voluntary arrangement unfairly prejudices the interests of  a creditor, member or contributor to the company; or (2) that 
there has been some material irregularity at or in relation to either of  the meetings. As will be presented in the next section, the fact 
that unsecured creditors have very limited practical control over IPs’ actions in market places means that they can only rely upon 
these formal legal mechanisms to exercise their influence and seek redress. However, even this limited ability to challenge is severely 
undermined by practical factors. As revealed by the OFT, the median value for the average amount owed to unsecured creditors is 
£3000, which is likely to be negligibly small compared to the amount of  money and time they have had to devote to be actively 
involved in the proceedings.89 This inevitably reduces the incentive for unsecured creditors to seek redress. 
 
In the limited number of  cases where creditors have tried to rely on s 6, the authorities further noted the difficulty of  proving unfair 
prejudice and succeeding in such a challenge. On the grounds that there is no universal test for judging “prejudice” and “unfairness” 
in this context,90 the current applicable test of  fairness creates difficulty for creditors in challenging the CVA proposal on the basis 
of  s 6. Perhaps a good starting point would be to review Re T & N Ltd.91 In this case, through a comparison of  the criteria for 
judging fairness for a scheme of  arrangement under s 425 of  the Companies Act 1985 (now s. 896 of  the Companies Act 2006) and 
the CVA under discussion, David Richards J. pointed out that in the former circumstance the proponents should satisfy the court 
that the scheme should be sanctioned, whereas under s 6 the objector (i.e. an unsecured creditor) is under an onus to establish unfair 
                                                 
86 Commissioners of  Inland Revenue v Adam & Partners [2001] 1 BCLC 222. 
87 S 5(2)(b) of  IA1986. 
88 S 3(3) and 5(2) of  Insolvency Act 1986. 
89 Office of  Fair Trading, The Market for Corporate Insolvency Practitioners – A Market Study, (2010) OFT 1245, at 5, 44–5. 
90 Re a debtor (No 101 of  1999) [ 2001] 1 BCLC 54, at 63, per Ferris J. 
91 [2005] 2 BCLC 488 
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prejudice.92 Coupled with the usual provision that a CVA is determined by a single vote of  all creditors, and differential treatment 
of  creditors is not necessarily sufficient to establish unfair prejudice,93 in practice this onus often works to the detriment of  a class 
of  unsecured creditors who are outranked by other creditors with different interests. As asserted in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v PRG 
Powerhouse Ltd,94 there may be circumstances in which a CVA may properly provide for one class of  creditors to be paid in full while 
others receive only a fraction of  the company’s liability to them. Had this unfair result happened in a scheme of  arrangement in the 
company law context, it could have been prevented since the scheme needs approval from each voting class of  creditors. However, 
this is not achievable under a CVA, for which purpose all creditors form a single class and inevitably the interests of  those who were 
disadvantaged will almost inevitably be trumped.95   
 
D. Undue Favours from the Insolvency Practitioners: Access to Information and Interference with the Operation of  the 
Company 
 
Additional to the insufficient regulatory consideration of  unsecured creditors and their limited ability to seek redress, the measure of  
practical control afforded to secured creditors over Insolvency Practitioners (IP) and the business of  the debtor company may also 
cause harm to these vulnerable market participants. The terms of  the security agreement commonly provides for the debtor 
company to report regularly to the secured creditors in case the debtor gets into financial difficulties, and the secured creditors will, 
in many cases, have direct influence on management decisions.96 Robust evidence suggests that although the IP in an administration 
is usually appointed by the directors of  the company, secured creditors, particularly banks, can veto this choice and make the final 
decision.97 This factor, combined with the fact that secured creditors are often repeat players in the insolvency process, means that 
IPs have a strong incentive to form and maintain strong relationships with secured creditors to ensure a steady income, which 
consequently results in their tendency to respond to the wishes of  secured creditors.98 In stark contrast, unsecured creditors have 
no influence in the appointment of  the IP, and nor do they have a steady long-term relationship with IPs, except for a few large 
                                                 
92 Re T & N Ltd, [2005] 2 BCLC 488, per Richards J, at 81. 
93 Re a debtor (No 101 of  1999) [ 2001] 1 BCLC 54, at 63, per Ferris J; Sisu Capital Fund Ltd v Tucker [2006] BBC 463, at 134, per Warren J. 
94 [2008] 1 BCLC 289, at 313, per Etherton J.  
95 [2008] 1 BCLC 289, at 313, per Etherton J; Sisu Capital Fund Ltd v Tucker [2006] BBC 463, at 134, per Warren J. in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v PRG Powerhouse 
Ltd, the unfair prejudice claim was nevertheless upheld, on the basis of  the unusual feature of  the claimants as landlords with valuable guarantees. For further 
discussion, see B Hannigan, Company Law, 2nd ed, (2009, OUP), 604–5. 
 
96 Paul L. Davies, S. Worthington & E. Micheler, Gower and Davies’ Principles of  Modern Company Law, 8th ed, (2008, Sweet & Maxwell), at 1162. 
97 As evidence has revealed, most banks would form panels to directly select IP firms for their insolvency cases, particularly where indebtedness to the bank 
exceeds £200, 000. See Office of  Fair Trading, The Market for Corporate Insolvency Practitioners – A Market Study, (2010) OFT 1245, at 4–5. Also see academic 
discussion in J. Armour, A. Hsu & A. Walters, The Costs and Benefits of  Secured Creditor Control in Bankruptcy: Evidence from the UK, University of  Cambridge Centre for 
Business Research Working Paper No. 332, (March 2009). 
98 Office of  Fair Trading, The Market for Corporate Insolvency Practitioners – A Market Study, (2010) OFT 1245, at 4–5, 
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ones such as HM Revenue and Customs. The small magnitude of  their interests at stake further constrains their ability and incentive 
to maintain oversight on the IPs.99 
 
Given these factors, it is not surprising that IPs have little incentive to correct the disadvantaged position of  unsecured creditors. 
This is particularly demonstrated in the information asymmetry suffered by unsecured creditors. Unsecured creditors are usually 
ill-informed; normally only general information on insolvency procedures will be provided by IPs, rather than information relevant 
to the case-specific process.100 They are usually too small and poor to hire specialists; therefore, the complexity, time and cost of  
inspecting documents often prevents them from successfully investigating the company.101 In stark contrast, in addition to gaining 
priority for payment, securities fulfill the purpose of  offering secured creditors privileged access to information, as well as a certain 
amount of  control over the conduct of  the debtor’s business which may not be achieved by exclusive reliance on personal 
covenant.102 This is particularly the case when secured creditors are large banks who employ professional legal and financial experts 
to advise upon and draw up legal arrangements relating to secured lending.103 This point was noted by Lindley LJ in the Court of  
Appeal in the Salomon case104, where it was suggested that in practice it is often inevitable for small business persons to ignore 
essential information regarding the company’s status, including a register of  security interests. Otherwise, the trade creditors in this 
celebrated case would have been placed on notice of  Mr Salomon’s first priority secured debenture.105 
 
III. THE ECONOMIC BASES OF SECURED FINANCING: A CHALLENGABLE PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
As presented in the foregoing sections, the respect for pre-bankruptcy ordering of  entitlements has long marked the primary thesis 
of  UK insolvency law, including the tilted balance in favour of  creditors holding security. Founded on the premise of  
contractarianism,106 which emphasises the sanctity of  bargains and parties’ contractual power, the basic proposition is that the 
function of  insolvency law is merely to translate pre-bankruptcy assets and liabilities into the bankruptcy forum with minimal 
                                                 
99 As revealed by the OFT, the median value for the average amount owed to unsecured creditors is £3000, which is perceived as not outweighing the time and 
costs associated with using mechanisms to influence IPs. Office of  Fair Trading, The Market for Corporate Insolvency Practitioners – A Market Study, (2010) OFT 1245, 
at 5, 44–5. 
100 Office of  Fair Trading, The Market for Corporate Insolvency Practitioners – A Market Study, (2010) OFT 1245, at 5, 47; R.M. Goode, ‘Is the Law too Favourable to 
Secured Creditors?’ (1983) 8 Canadian Business Law Journal 53 at 56; J. Hudson, ‘The Case Against Secured Lending’ (1995) International Review of  Law and Economics 
47. 
101 V. Finch, ‘Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who Pays the Price?’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 633 at 638. 
102 R.M. Goode, ‘Is the Law too Favourable to Secured Creditors?’ (1983) 8 Canadian Business Law Journal 53 at 56. 
103 J. Hudson, ‘The Case Against Secured Lending’ (1995) International Review of  Law and Economics 47 at 56. 
104 Salomon v Salomon Co [1897] AC 22. 
105 D Kershaw, Company Law in Context, (2009, OUP), at 709. 
106 The term “contractarianism” is used here for its economic implications, and is different from the word “contractarianism” in legal philosophy. 
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dislocation.107 Regardless of  the level of  risk he faces, it is argued that any creditor is at liberty to insert risk-reducing devices in his 
private arrangements with the debtor, e.g. insisting on a premium interest rate for lending, or asking for a security interest. “Every 
man is the master of  the contract he may choose to make, and it is of  the highest importance that every contract should be 
construed according to the intention of  the contracting parties”.108 Putting this in the insolvency context, contractarian theorists 
hold that only those with consensual claims against the debtor’s assets at the time of  the opening of  the insolvency proceedings 
qualify for consideration as parties to the agreement.109 If  one were to extend this thesis to the conflict between the interests of  
secured and unsecured creditors, secured financing becomes a mere reflection of  the diverse choices of  risk-reducing strategies 
made by different creditors. The substantive priority rights in bargains acquired by secured creditors ex ante should be at the 
forefront of  values to be protected, ahead of  those who have bargained otherwise, i.e. creditors who choose to forego security and 
assume greater risk in exchange for quicker and better lending interests, more efficient contract processes or less formal credit 
investigations.  
 
While this contractarian argument clearly articulates the legitimacy of  the priority order between secured and voluntary unsecured 
creditors, it falls short of  taking proper account of  interests other than these so-called contract creditors. At the very least, a number 
of  creditors are truly involuntary,110 e.g. unpaid employees and disgruntled trade creditors, and the reason they cannot take security 
arrangements is not because they did not bargain for that right, but because they become creditors without their volition, who 
almost always have little knowledge of  security arrangements and of  how to protect their own interests. If  we follow the 
contractarian argument, distribution of  the assets to these non-consensual interest holders, including tort creditors and unpaid 
suppliers, might be desirable, but this premise is fundamentally different from distributions based on the ex ante bargain, and these 
entitlements should be provided in other systems of  law.111 This argument utterly overlooks the fact that it is only on insolvency 
that the ranking issue of  these unsecured claims arises, and there is no scope within the general law to prescribe priority and 
protection for these involuntary creditors.112 As succinctly commented by Lynn LoPucki, security is an institution “in need of  basic 
reform” because it tends to misallocate resources by imposing on unsecured creditors a bargain to which many, if  not most, of  
them have given no meaningful consent.113  
                                                 
107 E.g. see Thomas H. Jackson, “Bankruptcy, Nonbankruptcy and the Creditors’ Bargain” (1982) 91 Yale Law Journal 857; T. Jackson & R. Scott, “On the Nature 
of  Bankruptcy: an Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain” (1989) 75 Virginia Law Review 155; Thomas H. Jackson, “Translating Assets and 
Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum” (1985) 14 Journal of  Legal Studies 73; R. Goode, Principles of  Corporate Insolvency Law (2011, Sweet & Maxwell), at 70–2. 
108 Clarke v. Watson (1865) 17 C.B.R., U.S. 278.  
109 See R. Goode, Principles of  Corporate Insolvency Law (2011, Sweet & Maxwell), at 70–2; Thomas H. Jackson & R. Scott, “On the Nature of  Bankruptcy: an Essay 
on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain” (1989) 75 Virginia Law Review 155, at 177. 
110 V. Finch, ‘Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who pays the price?’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 660. 
111 E.g. Thomas Jackson, The Logic and Limits of  Bankruptcy Law, (1986), at 31–32. 
112 R. Goode, Principles of  Corporate Insolvency Law (2011, Sweet & Maxwell), 74. 
113 L.M. LoPucki, ‘The Unsecured Creditors Bargain’ (1994) Virginia Law Review 1887 at 1891.  
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Furthermore, this contractual argument establishes itself  on the basis of  a hypothetical bargain made by rational parties for the 
purpose of  maximising the collective value of  the proceedings, and it assumes equal bargaining positions between the debtor 
company and every voluntary creditor. This is not connecting to reality. Additional to those who are completely involuntary, the 
identity of  unsecured creditors could also be owing to the fact that they are not able to require the debtor to provide security; the 
debtor company may already have charged its assets to other creditors, or it wish to keep its assets unencumbered so it can utilise 
them at a later time.114 Small trade creditors, for instance, often have no opportunity to collect information which would make them 
equal bargainers, and they might lack the resources, expertise and time to evaluate risks accurately.115  
 
In practice the collective rights of  unsecured creditors as a group also tend to be trumped by IPs’ favour towards secured creditors. 
In a hypothetical bargaining process, when a debtor grants a security interest to one of  his creditors, he increases the riskiness for 
other creditors by reducing their expected value in insolvency.116 Thus, it is a fair assumption that the interests charged by unsecured 
creditors to compensate for that risk are naturally higher in comparison to the interests charged by secured creditors. However, 
robust evidence has proved that practice has moved in the opposite direction; in many cases, banks’ interest rates for secured loans 
have not gone down, as would be anticipated in theory.117 The reason is succinctly stated by Professor Armour: “Of  course, in the 
real world, all … things are seldom equal.”118 The contractarian argument not only fails to consider the interests of  involuntary 
unsecured creditors, but falls short of  correcting the unfair treatment suffered in practice by the general group of  unsecured 
creditors. It does not come as a surprise that the concept of  freedom of  contract has since attracted stern criticism, led by Patrick 
Atiyah who described the rise to prominence of  freedom of  contract as a political, economic and legal ideal with a high point in the 
1870s and a subsequent gradual decline:119 while “freedom of  choice was whittled down in many directions, government regulations 
replaced free contract, … and paternalism once again was the order of  the day”.120 It is thus necessary to interfere with freedom of  
contract and restricted it in a number of  ways,121 with legal intervention and redistribution mainly in the favour of  parties who are 
in relatively weaker, and vulnerable contracting parties such as consumers, employees or tenants.122  
                                                 
114 S. Schwarcz, ‘The Easy Case for the Priority of  Secured Claims in Bankruptcy’ (1997) 47 Duke Law Journal 425 at 447.  
115 Justice, Insolvency Law: An Agenda for Reform London (1994) 6. 
116 See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, “Secured Financing and Priorities among Creditors”, (1979) 88(6) The Yale Law Journal 1143, at 1147. 
117R. Goode, Principles of  Corporate Insolvency Law (2011, Sweet & Maxwell), 76-7; also see J. Armour, “The Law and Economics Debate about Secured Lending: 
Lessons for European Lawmaking?” (2008) European Company and Financial Law Review 3, at 10–11. 
118 See J. Armour, “The Law and Economics Debate about Secured Lending: Lessons for European Lawmaking?” (2008) European Company and Financial Law 
Review 3, at 13. 
119 P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of  Freedom of  Contract (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1985).  
120 P.S. Atiyah, Essays on Contract (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1988) Essay 12: ‘Freedom of  Contract and the New Right’ 355 at 356.  
121 P.S. Atiyah, Essays on Contract (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1988) Essay 6: ‘Freedom of  Contract and the New Right’ 355. 
122 D. Kimel, ‘Neutrality, Autonomy, and Freedom of  Contract’ (2001) 21 Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies 473 at 474; see also Unfair Contract Term Act 1977, 
Employment Protection Act 1978, Employment Act 1989, Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1992, Landlord and Tenant Act 1985.  
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The other economic justification of  secured financing rests on its positive value in reducing transaction costs, primarily monitoring 
costs. As suggested, in order to discourage potential misbehaviour on the part of  the debtor, as well as increasing the interest rate of  
the loan, a creditor may also reduce the risk by monitoring the debtor’s conduct. The creation of  a security in such circumstances 
will benefit the relevant creditor in two ways: reducing the riskiness of  the loan in the event of  the debtor’s insolvency, and the 
reduction of  the monitoring cost required to guard against the debtor.123 The creditor will be immune from the debtor’s 
misbehaviour and the risk of  loss, as long as he focuses his attention on the particular items of  property securing his loan. This 
results in substantive savings of  money and effort in comparison with his counterparts without security, who have to bear the 
complex task of  overseeing the debtor’s performance.124 
 
Compared to the contractarian argument, which is made in connection only with consensual securities, this transaction cost view 
offers a convincing justification for non-consensual securities, e.g. the common law lien and the equitable lien arising from the 
operation of  law.125 However, it rests on two questionable premises: first, that unsecured creditors have the ability and will in 
practice to spend more time and effort in monitoring the debtor company after their counterparts take security. Secondly, compared 
to a situation where all creditors are unsecured, unsecured creditors will now charge higher interest and secured creditors will charge 
a lower rate, to reflect the varied risks of  loans and the different monitoring costs they must now incur. While the latter assumption 
has already been practically refuted in the context of  contractarianism, equally the former cannot stand the reality test, which 
involves interactions of  wider considerations than mere economic rationality. Many unsecured creditors in practice are small and 
involuntary, such as unpaid suppliers and tort claimants. These unsecured creditors, before they become so, had neither the incentive 
nor the resources to monitor the status of  securities. When they become unsecured creditors, they have no ability to adjust their 
position either by bargaining for security ex ante or by bearing the cost of  monitoring the debtor.126 Statistics have revealed that 
unsecured creditors have little say in processes of  insolvency as their formal methods of  oversight are rarely used: a committee is 
formed in only 3% of  administrations, and even fewer in cases of  CVA.127 
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125 For further discussions on non-consensual securities, see Bell, Modern Law of  Personal Property in England and Ireland, (London, 1989), at 138–141; Paul L. Davies, 
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Journal 93. Strictly speaking, a preferential creditor who does not own security is also an unsecured creditor. However, in this article, the definition of  unsecured 
creditors will exclude preferential creditors. 
127 Office of  Fair Trading, The Market for Corporate Insolvency Practitioners – A Market Study, (2010) OFT 1245, at 43–4. 
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One also needs to be aware that the legitimacy of  secured financing is based on the premise of  proper notice. The grant of  security 
does not involve an unfair preference while other creditors also have proper notice of  the security interest, as they have not been 
misled into thinking that the assets comprising the security are the unencumbered property of  the debtor.128 For unsecured 
creditors, requiring a company to register particular details of  charges is their only means of  knowing about any earlier secured 
lending that ranks ahead of  their own claims. However, the law currently fails to achieve this premise: while s 860(7) of  CA2006 
provides an exhaustive list of  charges to be registered, quasi-securities that rank ahead of  unsecured creditors’ claims are not all 
included.129 Further complexity arises with regard to registered charges with inaccuracies. English law states that inaccurate 
particulars will not destroy the validity of  security.130 However, this creates difficulties for unsecured creditors, as they may be 
misled by incorrect particulars available from the Registrar, while the parties to the security agreement will operate on the basis of  
the correct terms.131 
 
Although the current insolvency regime underpinned by contractarianism and transaction costs has its defects, substantive changes 
in favour of  the protection of  unsecured creditors are unlikely to occur within the system. For the courts, if  the fundamental tenet 
in commercial law, i.e. the exclusive and inviolable rights of  secured creditors, had been disturbed, there would be significant 
repercussions for the community. Significantly, as pointed out by the London Investment Banking Association (LIBA), the sanction 
of  the scheme would have had “unfortunate implications for London as a world financial centre”.132 As a global financial centre, 
London has a large share of  the international financial markets and has always taken a lead in conducting investment business.133 A 
factor of  particular importance in relation to London’s strength in financial activities is the existence of  a reliable and robust legal 
insolvency regime.134 It is not difficult to predict that if  the sanctity of  the rights attached to security became distorted, many clients 
and creditors would become concerned as to the future safety of  their assets, which would have repercussions for investment 
activity and the reputation of  London as the heart of  financial business.135 Previous practice also proves the difficulty of  
substantive reform in this field. Receivership was replaced in 2003 by administration with the intent of  enhancing accountability to 
unsecured creditors in the governance of  bankrupt firms, but robust evidence has since proved that the change in the law tended to 
                                                 
128 R.M. Goode, ‘Is the Law too Favourable to Secured Creditors?’ (1983) 8 Canadian Business Law Journal 53 at 57. 
129 For instance, the retention of  title agreement is not within the list and does not need to be registered.  
130 For instance, National Provincial and Union Bank v Charnley [1924] 1 KB 431 (contained misstatement of  the property charged). 
131 For instance, Davis v Radcliffe [1990] 1 WLR 821; for further discussions, see Paul L. Davies, S. Worthington & E. Micheler, Gower and Davies’ Principles of  
Modern Company Law, 8th ed, (2008, Sweet & Maxwell), at 1183–91. 
132 Ibid. 
133 The financial sector is the largest contributor to the UK balance of  payments, and is a major contributor to GDP and employment. Taking multiple 
performance perspectives into consideration, including banking, insurance, equity markets, derivatives, foreign exchanges, etc., London has been constantly ranked 
first in the Global Financial Centres Index over the past three years. IFSL, International Financial Markets in the UK, May 2010, available at 
http://www.thecityuk.com/media/154873/ifm%20in%20the%20uk%2005%202010.pdf, last accessed on 01/07/10, at 3. 
134 HM Treasury, Establishing Resolution Arrangements for Investment Banks, (2009, London: OPSI), at 3. 
135 Also see S. Wen & J. Zhao, (2010) “Revisiting the Scope of  a Scheme of  Arrangement - Insights Derived from Lehman”, vol 3(3) Bankers Law 20, 26. 
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be counterbalanced by IPs’ practice favouring secured creditors, as well as other practical factors such as the concomitantly increased 
bankruptcy costs.136 Therefore, it is worthwhile and desirable to acquire and establish protection measures or systems outside the 
insolvency law regimes to promote the interests of  unsecured creditors, with CSR being a serious option. 
 
IV. PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF UNSECURED CREDITORS BY THE USE OF CSR 
 
A. Implications of  CSR Factors for Unsecured Creditors 
 
So far a consensus regarding the definition of  CSR has yet to be reached, which is not least owing to the constantly adjusting 
expectations and demands of  stakeholders in rapid-changing corporate practices. The following definitions from different sources 
adequately demonstrate the divergences among these variable constructions. Accordingly to Davis, CSR is the firm’s consideration 
of, and response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, technical, and legal requirements of  the firm … to accomplish social 
benefits along with the traditional economic gains which the firm seeks.137 Elkingston holds that CSR is taking care of  societal, 
ecological and economical concerns.138 Carroll and Buchholtz further expand on the scale of  CSR, advocating that it encompasses 
the economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic expectations placed on organisations by society at a given point in time.139  
 
As to the substance of  CSR, Williams and Siegal describe it as a situation where companies participate in public welfare issues more 
than is required for their interests by legal regulations.140 On the other hand, Baker delineates CSR as a business administration 
procedure for a general good effect on society.141 Nakajima focuses on directors’ responsibility that lead to corporations’ voluntary 
actions which are over and above legal requirements, and which contribute to sustainable economic development so that the 
business can address both its own competitive interests and the interests of  wider society.142 Additional to these scholars from 
various disciplines, a variety of  definitions are also provided by international organizations. For instance, United Nations considers 
CSR as directors’ responsibility which aims both to examine the role of  business in society, and to maximise the positive societal 
outcomes of  business activity,143 while World Business Council for Sustainable Development describes CSR as the continuing 
                                                 
136 J. Armour, A. Hsu & A. Walters, The Cost and Benefits of  Secured Creditor Control in Bankruptcy: Evidence from the UK (March, 2009), available at 
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commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic development while improving the quality of  life of  the 
workforce and their families as well as of  the local community and society at large.144 
 
Despite the fact that the term CSR has been defined in various ways, a few common characteristics can be drawn. First of  all, CSR 
emphasises that responsible behaviour on the part of  corporations can help them achieve wider goals, in particular the general good 
of  society. The promotion of  these wider goals involves making the case for corporate responsibility, respected corporate citizenship, 
environmental stewardship, pollution control and sustainable development by considering disadvantaged and vulnerable stakeholders. 
Secondly, the scope of  CSR mainly focuses on social and environmental concerns, in addition to the traditional economic goals of  
corporations. It aims to improve quality of  life and community harmonisation, working towards a more sustainable society as a 
whole via the performance of  corporations. Last but not least, despite the fact that many definitions emphasise the voluntary 
characteristics of  CSR beyond enforceable legal requirements, the practice of  CSR is established on the basis of  the fulfilment of  
traditional economic and legal responsibilities, which are normally achieved via directors’ duties and corporate reports on social and 
environmental issues.145 CSR as a concept covers many issues, encompassing sustainability development, corporate governance 
development and corporate objectives, employment rights, consumer protection rights, occupational health and safety, local taxation 
law and socially responsible investments from shareholders, especially institutional shareholders. Working together with the 
enforcement measures through legal requirements, the motivation to embrace CSR can also be expressed as standard-setting practice 
through non-legal means such as adverse publicity, protests and boycotts by NGOs and the market.146 
 
 
In the legal domain, corporate practices are typically influenced by a variety of  instruments, such as securities regulations, taxation 
law, contract law, employment law, environmental law, consumer protection law and insolvency law.147 When they manage their 
businesses, directors will find “their decision tree considerably trimmed and their discretion decidedly diminished by mandatory legal 
rules enacted in the name of  protecting stakeholders.”148 While CSR is fundamentally affected by how law and other forms of  
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regulation delineate,149 it by no means is limited to legal prescriptions or prohibitions; it also embraces what is morally and 
philanthropically permissible.150 In practice, CSR is expected to begin where the primary laws end, and in the immediate future it 
will find the most use where there is no definite consensus regarding the ethics of  particular business practices. The interaction 
between law and CSR will therefore embrace a minimum position of  legal compliance, as well as societal considerations where the 
law is lacking, and will lean towards facilitating corporate contributions to sustainable development and other forms of  community 
investment where the business case warrants it.”151  
 
CSR is an issue of  potential significance not only to companies but also to wider society in terms of  both welfare and 
development,152 in the sense that CSR may “assist a government in fulfilling welfare state goals of  political character or based in law 
as obligations”.153 In America, President Obama has called for a new concept of  responsibility as the only proportional remedy for 
a crisis of  infinite magnitude, the result of  the US recession.154 In the EU, a Socialist and Green Member of  the European 
Parliament argued against a purely voluntary policy for CSR and urged the European Commission to impose binding rules to 
regulate corporate behaviours.155 Effective CSR requires dialogue and partnership with stakeholders such as trade unions, public 
authorities, non-governmental organisations, and business representative organisations.156 Support for CSR also comes from the 
United Nations. According to the Ruggie Report 2011 produced by John Ruggie, the UN Special Representative for Business and 
Human Rights,157 member states are required to ensure that “their current policies, legislation, regulation and enforcement measures 
are effective in addressing the risk of  business involvement in gross human rights abuses”.158 Besides human rights, when discussing 
issues concerning supply chains and CSR, John Ruggie also emphasised the “urgency of  bringing government back in to the 
equation”.159 This is consistent with the findings from Vogel, who noted the limited function of  NGOs and the market in 
promoting the ethics of  firms, underlining the necessity for effective regulation from government.160     
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Because of  various types of  CSR-related performance, the regulations governing CSR are also in a variety of  forms and are drafted 
and enforced by regulatory bodies at different levels. At the most fundamental level, government regulations are normally formal 
and binding in law, above which there are recommendations that have guiding effects but no legal standing. Meanwhile, globalisation 
has further increased the complexity of  the legal environment by exposing corporations to international law and the laws of  foreign 
nations.161 Under the banner of  CSR, many local and international institutions also seek to raise public awareness of  the necessity 
for transnational corporations to abide by certain health, environmental and social standards. Progressive advocates who are 
engaged in promoting more sustainable businesses, more environmentally-friendly companies and firms focused on human rights 
will also drive corporations to adopt more socially responsible ethical codes and guidelines for conduct, the adoption of  which is 
largely on a voluntary basis. In reality companies are regulated and closely monitored by various groups, who include shareholders, 
public authorities, intergovernmental bodies, trade unions, NGOs, insurers and consumer groups.162 All these positive and 
responsible actions will in turn have a collective societal-friendly impact on the government’s subsequent policies and legislative 
direction. CSR-related actions are thus based on a good mix of  social and legal norms, and legal requirements to report 
non-financial issues are becoming increasingly common in countries in the EU and elsewhere.163 
 
B. Applying CSR in the Favour of  Unsecured Creditors in Order to Rebalance the Insolvency System 
 
The development of  CSR is almost invariably stimulated by failures of  legal regulation and compliance. In the case of  unsecured 
creditor protection, the legal vacuum discussed above needs to be filled through the enforcement of  CSR-related obligations and 
favourable treatments, a possible remedy being setting out control over errant directors’ performance. The purpose underlying such 
treatment, which clearly indicated the interrelation between unsecured creditor protection and elements of  CSR, can be traced back 
to the Cork Report. Besides distributing the insolvent estate to creditors, it is stated that insolvency law should function as a “means 
by which the demands of  commercial morality can be met, through the investigation and the disciplinary measures and restrictions 
imposed on the bankrupt”.164 Such control was not merely towards punishing the errant, but towards exposing affairs to creditors 
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and encouraging public security,165 so as to promote the “highest standards of  business probity and competence”.166 This objective 
of  commercial morality fits with the purpose of  CSR in terms of  promoting the long-term competitiveness of  companies and 
encouraging the consideration of  wider interests. 
 
Society has an interest in insolvency processes. As pointed out by Professor Goode, by closing businesses, corporate insolvency has 
a negative impact on customers and suppliers; by causing job losses, it tears the heart out of  the employees and the local community; 
in cases involving large-scale companies, even the national economy may be threatened.167 In this process, the welfare of  vulnerable 
parties, particularly unsecured creditors who are not able to fully protect their interests against secured ones in insolvency,168 
deserves to be safeguarded. Unsecured creditors always have a positive view of  the company when they become loan providers, in 
the absence of  information or doubts about the successful running of  the company. Under circumstances where corporations are in 
financial trouble, the fact that secured creditors appoint the insolvency professionals means that these practitioners have less 
incentive to act in the interests of  unsecured creditors. In these cases, secured creditors are better able to cope and withstand the 
insolvency situations of  the debtor than are the unsecured creditors, and they should suffer some diminution in their distributional 
rights in order to balance the equality of  distribution among various creditors.169 According to recent statistics published by the 
Office of  Fair Trading, in around 63% of  cases in the field, secured creditors exert control over the fees and activities of  insolvency 
practitioners. Even in the other 37% of  cases, unsecured creditors are still unable to influence the professionals.170 The fact that in 
the majority of  cases unsecured creditors are insufficiently represented and defended makes the need for increased protection even 
more self-evident.171 Therefore, the reform of  the current corporate regulatory system so as to strengthen the ability and 
opportunity for unsecured creditors to recover their debts seems necessary in terms of  enhancing the practice of  fair trading and 
maintaining a competitive economy. It may also help achieve other objectives, such as raising standards of  business conduct and 
entrepreneurship.172 
 
In jurisdictions where the insolvency system is not able to make radical and efficient changes to completely transform the 
disadvantaged position of  unsecured creditors, such as the UK, CSR-related measures in other fields of  law are also called for as a 
serious alternative to enhance the interests of  unsecured creditors and achieve fairness among all stakeholders. The consideration of  
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unsecured creditors in the name of  CSR is also consistent with the objective of  a well-organised corporate governance system, 
which is to ensure that companies are run in a way that uses society’s resources efficiently, including a balanced and sustainable 
capital resources distribution. Favourable treatment is thus justifiable on the basis of  building a better corporate governance 
framework that benefits companies through greater access to finance, lower cost of  capital and more favourable treatment of  all 
stakeholders.173  
 
Unsecured creditors, as a class of  key external economic stakeholders, play an integral role in the stakeholder group network. 
Despite the fact that the unsecured creditors are not the main loan capital providers in comparison with secured creditors, their 
satisfaction and the image of  corporations from the point of  view of  unsecured creditors is very important in building an efficient 
and well balanced capital market. As a consequence, they should be viewed as worthy beneficiaries of  CSR if  one views the 
company as an “organic community” in the broader sense, having economic, legal, social and philanthropic responsibility in the 
corporate responsibility pyramid.174 At the same time, there are certain limits that should be placed on the contractual powers of  
stronger parties where the agreements made are “socially undesirable for reasons of  inefficiency, inequity and other substantive 
objections.”175 
 
Improving the social responsibility records is always a good business strategy to promote corporate image and the long-term 
interests of  the company. The benefits of  CSR for a company, such as higher employee morale, a positive corporate reputation and 
more efficient and reliable relationships with creditors (including unsecured creditors), will not appear immediately on balance sheets; 
rather, it will be demonstrate in the long run.176 Companies endorsing CSR strategies will face fewer business risks in comparison 
with their competitors, and will be in a better position to attract and retain creditors. Therefore, corporations with respected and 
sustainable records see CSR enforcement as an opportunity to be seized in order to pursue competitive advantages, rather than as a 
problem to deal with or a task to accomplish.177 The protection of  unsecured creditors will be of  particular importance for 
corporations’ reputation and image, as it will enable companies, as responsible and sophisticated borrowers, to be in a better 
position to obtain capital quickly and at a lower cost. CSR activities towards unsecured creditors might seemingly have no immediate 
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financial reward, but they are de facto rational for companies to achieve a desirable “win-win” situation for both business and 
unsecured creditors in a long-term sustainable business environment. 
 
The protection of  unsecured creditors also fits into the logic of  the business case for CSR. The business case emphasizes the link 
between CSR and sustainable development, and offers corporations guidance in becoming both responsible and profitable 
entities.178 The CSR case for considering unsecured creditors will act as a good component of  a sustainable company system, 
described by Chris Laszlo as “an integrated economic, social, and environmental approach leading to more enduring shareholder 
value … [as] a source of  innovation and profitable rather than added cost”.179 Unsecured creditors, as a stakeholders group with 
dual identities – an economic identity as capital providers, and as social identity as parties who are in a disadvantaged position – 
should be put on the protection list in order to establish a sustainable company. More care should be offered to this stakeholder 
group to create corporate strategies for integrity and fair play – and, from the experience of  twelve companies, “caring capitalism is 
not only decent, it is also profitable”.180 Despite the fact that these cares and responsibilities might entail short-term costs, they will 
pay off  for the companies in the long term, since they benefit from greater social legitimacy, fewer less government regulations and 
increased long-term profitability.181  
 
It is important to recognise here that CSR is not philanthropy, donations or gifting giving from profits, but involves the exercise of  
socially responsibility in how profits are made. This can be achieved more efficiently in a long-term manner by giving unsecured 
creditors the share of  consideration they deserve.182 This approach will not only help to persuade companies to adopt CSR for the 
interests of  various stakeholders who are in need of  extra care beyond contractual rights, such as unsecured creditors, but will also 
be adopted by lawyers to justify a broader legal interpretation and wider legitimacy of  directors’ responsibilities. 
 
V.  PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF UNSECURED CREDITORS THROUGH THE 
MEANS OF CSR 
 
Based on the arguments for embracing CSR on a mandatory footing as well as on a voluntary basis, the law should be employed 
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positively to ensure that companies act responsibly with regard to stakeholders, especially vulnerable stakeholders under certain 
circumstances.183 Apart from the inadequate insolvency legislations discussed above, current UK corporate law and governance 
regimes, within which the focus has been on the balance between the interests of  shareholders and stakeholders on a broad 
spectrum, also demand more protection for unsecured creditors. 
 
Despite the fact that the Companies Act 2006 is over seven hundred pages long, the way that directors should take account of  the 
conflicting interests between secured and unsecured creditors in the process of  running the company, particularly, how to make 
directors take responsibility for considering and acting appropriately in the interests of  unsecured creditors, is not prescribed. Under 
current UK law, directors are still under an obligation to act in favour of  the aim of  maximising shareholders’ benefits, or, in the 
words of  s 172 (1), to “promote the success of  the company for the benefit of  its members as a whole.” Their obligation towards 
creditors as a general group is provided in s 172(3), which will come into play if  “certain circumstances” occur, i.e. the company 
entering financial difficulty and being on the edge of  insolvency. Further clarification regarding the consideration of  unsecured 
creditors’ interests seems desirable in this section. In the same way that directors are required to “have regard to the need to act 
fairly between the members of  the company”, an additional factor could be inserted into s 172(3), asking directors to “have regard 
to the need to balance secured and unsecured creditors’ interests wherever possible”. All that would be required here is that 
directors take these interests into account in good faith. This will not contradict the overriding objective of  a company’s directors to 
act “for the benefit of  its members as a whole”,184 and neither would it interfere with directors acting for creditors’ interests as a 
whole when the company encounters difficulties. However, for directors who have the opportunity to give more consideration to 
unsecured creditors, this insertion would provide them with legitimate grounds to do so. 
 
Additional legislative changes to improve the situation of  unsecured creditors have also been proposed by a number of  scholars, 
many of  whom are of  the view that mandatory provisions should be put in place to provide a means of  redress for unsecured 
creditors if  their interests are unfairly prejudiced. For instance, as argued by Riley, “the duty (of  directors to consider creditor 
interests) must demand something more than a mere statement after the event that the directors gave a thought to the creditors, but 
then decided to act in a way contrary to their interests.”185 In her celebrated work Andersen suggests an even more radical approach, 
which is that personal responsibility should be imposed on directors in solvent companies for behaviour that may damage the 
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interests of  non-shareholder stakeholders, particularly unsecured creditors.186 The grounds for such a suggestion lie in the claim 
that directors are “in the best position to assess what is required for external stakeholder protection and should have the incentive to 
do so.”187 Alternatively, as suggested by Rao, Sokolow and White, if  creditors are presented with the ability to threaten directors 
with a lawsuit to hold them personally liable for their actions, this should effectively “limit shareholder expropriation of  remaining 
firm value.”188 
 
Effectively, providing redress for unsecured creditors in the form of  threatening directors with a lawsuit requires directors to act not 
only in the interests of  shareholders, as presently required by s 172(1), but also in the interests of  unsecured creditors. Theoretically, 
the above arguments fall within the scope of  stakeholder theory, which suggests that in corporate governance the interests of  a 
number of  stakeholder groups should be advanced by virtue of  directors’ discretion, without the interests of  a single group (the 
shareholders) being allowed to override the others.189 However, a number of  practical difficulties regarding the implementation of  a 
complete stakeholder model have been encountered in the UK corporate governance environment. For instance, changes in 
company law to offer redress to non-shareholder stakeholders would require a fundamental change to the current company law 
framework, and might lead to “unpredictable and damaging effects.”190 In addition, acting for concerns other than shareholders’ 
interests would increase managerial powers, which would in turn increase the risk of  managerial manipulation and “dangerously 
distracted management … at the expense of  economic growth and international competitiveness.”191 On the basis of  these practical 
concerns, s 172(1) only requires directors to take account of  stakeholders’ interests in good faith, but it does not require them to act 
for these interests. For the same reason, we have grounds to believe that a legislative change allowing directors to care for the 
interests of  unsecured creditors, but not requiring them to do so, will be in line with the current company law framework in the UK. 
 
In addition to reforms on directors duties, there are other possible legislative means to protect stakeholder groups, with information 
disclosure at a mandatory as primary one. Despite the fact that companies are increasingly disclosing CSR information, it is 
questionable whether the current annual, stand-alone CSR reports on social and environmental factors can satisfy the increasing 
demand for corporate accountability.192 The necessity of  mandatory reporting could thus be perceived in a number of  aspects, to 
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name but a few, “changing the corporate culture, incompleteness of  voluntary reports, comparability, non-disclosure of  negative 
performance, legal certainty, market failures, cost savings, standardisation and equal treatment of  investors”.193 Furthermore, as 
presented by Beattie and McInnes, legal mandates in this field will help to produce narrative disclosures of  a higher quality, which in 
turn will lead to an increase in the amount of  disclosure and reduce variability by an absolute amount attributable to the size of  the 
company.194 A possible way of  change is to introduce two-way communication, via a system under which information can be 
transferred between the company and its stakeholders in a bidirectional manner, so as to make the CSR information disclosure 
system more efficient.195 Under such a scheme, the “informing” direction will transmit messages to unsecured creditors about both 
CSR and financial performance via reports and other media, in order to involve them in the sustainable development of  the 
company. This involvement will enable them to provide voluntary sustainable support for socially responsible corporate behaviours 
and help them become more informed about the financial performance of  the company. On the other hand, the “listening” 
direction will also help the company to adapt to the needs of  unsecured creditors by listening to their voices through questionnaires, 
surveys, consulting sessions and collective opinion pools. Therefore, in line with directors’ duties to unsecured creditors, two-way 
information disclosure requirements for the interests of  unsecured creditors would seem to be necessary 
 
Another area that merits further reform is in the context of  a group of  companies, where the interests of  unsecured creditors are 
the most easily prejudiced. This is also an area of  great practical significance, because in reality even relatively modest businesses 
customarily operate through group companies, and multinational companies invariably do so.196 In terms of  business strategies and 
operations, the interrelationship between the parent company and its subsidiaries is generally inseparable – normally the subsidiaries 
will be wholly or mainly controlled by the parent or holding company in their business operations. Nevertheless, in the legal sense, 
given the rigidity of  UK law in applying the separate legal entity principle that was established in the celebrated case Salomon v A 
Salomon Ltd197, a subsidiary company will, in most circumstances, be regarded as a legal reality with a separate existence from the 
parent or holding company.198 Thus, in practice the operations of  subsidiary companies commonly become risk-diverters for the 
parent; business decisions are often made by the parent not to benefit the subsidiary, but rather to serve the best interests of  the 
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parent and the group of  companies as a whole.199 This places creditor groups of  the subsidiary, particularly unsecured creditor 
groups, in an extremely disadvantageous position – if  the subsidiary enters financial difficulty as a result of  these unfavourable 
decisions, creditors of  the subsidiary will not be able to enforce their claims against the parent or the holding company’s assets if  the 
subsidiary has insufficient assets to meet its liabilities, because of  the strict operation of  the Salomon rule.  
 
Although there have been some courageous judicial attempts to lift this corporate veil in English law, the most well-known being the 
“single economic entity” argument advocated by Lord Denning,200 subsequent cases have largely refuted this by stating that the 
Salomon principle should normally be applied in a strict way, and that the veil should be only lifted when the company was used as a 
façade201 or when the subsidiary was acting as an agent of  the parent.202 This agency relationship is hard to establish in practice: it 
must be clearly demonstrated, and cannot be inferred from control or ownership of  shares.203 This further increases the difficulty 
for creditors who have claims against the parent, particularly after the reaffirmation of  the separate legal entity principle in Adams v 
Cape Industries Plc.204  
 
Nevertheless, Lord Denning’s argument, though rarely followed, has found sympathy from many judges. One example is Staughton 
LJ’s statement in Atlas Maritime v Avalon Maritime (No.1):205 “The creation or purchase of  a subsidiary company with minimal liability, 
which will operate with the parent’s funds and on the parent’s directions but not expose the parent to liability, may not seem to some 
the most honest way of  trading.” Taking into consideration the injustice that the structure of  group companies can bring to 
creditors, group liability has been accepted to some extent in certain common law countries with the introduction of  contribution 
orders and the pooling of  assets on liquidation. For instance, it is provided in s 271 of  the New Zealand Companies Act 1993 that: 
 
(1) On the application of  the liquidator, or a creditor or shareholder, the court, if  satisfied that it is just and equitable to do so, 
may order that— 
(a) a company that is, or has been, related to the company in liquidation must pay to the liquidator the whole or part of  any or 
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all of  the claims made in the liquidation. 
(b) where two or more related companies are in liquidation, the liquidations in respect of  each company must proceed together 
as if  they were one company to the extent that the court so orders and subject to such terms and conditions as the court may 
impose.  
 
As can be seen from the provision above, a pooling order in the group company context has the potential to affect the rights of  a 
creditor in the event of  the insolvency of  a related company. Although the original legislative intent of  the New Zealand Companies 
Act 1993 does not concern the enhancement of  CSR, these provisions practically achieve similar ends, by increasing the opportunity 
for unsecured creditors to get at least partial recovery. As Justice Baragwanath commented in Mountfort v Tasman Pacific Airlines of  NZ 
Limited,206 “such an order … would reduce the parent’s return by only half  a cent in the dollar but bring the regional creditors to 
equality.” A similar provision in the UK insolvency context, requiring parent companies to pay to the liquidator the whole or part of  
any or all claims made by creditors on its subsidiaries in liquidation, might also offer a good additional recourse to these weak 
creditors of  firms experiencing financial distress. 
 
As well as potential statutory modifications, the enforcement and protection of  the interests of  unsecured creditors through the 
discretion of  directors could also be achieved by virtue of  voluntary methods that come under the aegis of  CSR. Directors could 
enhance the position of  unsecured creditors, as the least favoured group of  stakeholders, by including their interests in their 
strategic management policies and the ethical code of  the company and by giving directors the legitimacy to do so. 
 
The purpose of  a CSR policy is to describe the demeanour of  any organisation in a financially, socially and environmentally 
responsible way. The basic principles of  the concept are sustainability, accountability and transparency.207 Based on a meta-analysis 
of  fifty-two studies, encompassing 33,878 different observations carried out with the purpose of  demonstrating a relationship 
between corporate social performance and financial performance, it was found that “market forces generally do not penalize 
companies that are high in corporate social performance; thus, managers and directors can afford for their companies to be socially 
responsible”.208 
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By embracing the theme of  CSR in their business strategies, directors will be able to achieve business objectives with smoother 
cooperation from all constituencies, including unsecured creditors. Furthermore, companies that practice CSR accumulate benefits 
in terms of  better public relations, better economic results and the creation of  new opportunities, innovation and competitive 
advantages, and by being more attractive to potential investors who may, possibly, become unsecured creditors.209 CSR is more than 
just a cost, a constraint, or a charitable deed.210 Unsecured creditors who feel that they are treated fairly will be more willing to offer 
constant loans, and will be more loyal to the firm. These considerations may lead to considerable long-term corporate profitability 
and shareholder gain.211 
 
This so-called “stakeholder governance”, in which managers act honestly for the benefits of  other stakeholders including unsecured 
creditors, offers a better way to moderate and mitigate the pathological failure of  corporate firms, and offers the potential to use 
distinctive corporate attributes to serve society more efficiently.212 In the case of  unsecured creditors, they are at the bottom of  the 
priority ladder, and are merely given the right to an equal and proportional claim to any company funds that remain after the secured 
and preferential creditors have been satisfied.213 They are the ones who always lose the most when companies go into insolvency. 
However, funds from unsecured creditors have always been an important financial resource for companies. The unfavourable 
treatment of  this stakeholder group will prevent unsecured creditors from voluntarily putting their money at risk. With more active 
consideration of  their interests from directors, a more desirable result for the progress of  business can be achieved.214  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Analyses of  the practical position and legal treatment of  secured and unsecured creditors in an insolvency context clearly 
demonstrates the high level of  priority and benefits enjoyed by secured creditors. In stark contrast, unsecured creditors find 
themselves in a worrying position. They are a group of  extremely vulnerable market participants who systematically underestimate 
the risk of  the debtors’ business and charge less than they should, owing to their limited information and lack of  bargaining 
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power.215 The unfavourable situation of  unsecured creditors has been slightly enhanced in law since the enforcement of  the 
Enterprise Act 2002, but there was little practical improvement, owing to the lack of  information available to unsecured creditors, 
their limited ability to seek redress, and the management powers granted to secured creditors over the debtor company and IPs.  
 
Although the priority given to secured creditors has been commonly justified on basis of  various economic perspectives, including 
bargains, transaction cost and proper notice principles, a glance into the reality nonetheless suggests otherwise. The operation of  
secured financing generates practical results that severely prejudice unsecured creditors, especially involuntary creditors and trade 
creditors. Coupled with the additional fact that radical changes will unlikely be offered to promote the position of  unsecured 
creditors’ interests purely from within the insolvency law regime, CSR-related reform seems both necessary and desirable to ease the 
situation of  unsecured creditors.  
 
This paper presents reform suggestions at both statutory and voluntary levels with the aims of  ameliorating the unfavourable 
position of  unsecured creditors, and of  placing limits on the unbalancing power of  secured creditors in managing the debtor 
without being liable for misconduct. Significantly, suggestions were offered regarding the duties of  directors in terms of  promoting 
the success of  companies, as well as two-way information disclosure requirements in the long term. Alternatively, the protection of  
unsecured creditors could be achieved by including their interests in management policies aimed at promoting more socially 
responsible corporations and establishing more coherent stakeholder networks for a sound corporate governance framework. It is 
logical to conclude that as CSR is desirable and is becoming an acceptable norm in external strategic management policy, the 
interests of  unsecured creditors, who are in an inequitable and adverse position, should be given more serious consideration in order 
to create a more sustainable and long-term investment environment.  
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